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and yet have a definite value in their ratio to one another. This, to us, is *his* glaring oversight. But he may, we think, be said to have fathomed and rectified the intricacies of the Calculus so far as this can be done without extending a similar exhaustive research to the Philosophy of Mathematics in general; and he may be said at least to have "taken the bull by the horns" in commencing with the most difficult section of his subject. We await with interest the appearance of his treatise on Analytical Geometry, which we understand to be nearly or quite ready for publication, and of any future researches in the same spirit as those now before us, which, by exhibiting still more perfectly and forcibly the adaptation of all Mathematics to the service of the universal mind, may, by their reflected light, cast a much needed illumination on the universal laws of intelligence.

THEISM AND PANTHEISM.

[We have lately received from Dr. Franz Hoffmann, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Würzburg, a pamphlet entitled "Ueber Theismus und Pantheismus, eine Vorlesung gehalten vor einer Versammlung, &c., zu Würzburg, am xiv. März 1861." Dr. Hoffmann is already known to our readers (Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. i. p. 190) as an ardent defender of the doctrines of Theism against Pantheism. He is spoken of by Dr. Rosenkranz (Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. ii. p. 55) as the "most distinguished representative of the Philosophy of Baader." Whether right or not in charging Hegelianism with Pantheism in any of its forms—e. g. disbelief in the immortality of the soul, or in the personality of God—all clear-minded thinkers will agree that his labors in behalf of Theism are commendable at least in their spirit. "God, Freedom, and Immortality," form the great triune principle on which is founded the only positive solution of the Problem of Life. It is with great pleasure, therefore, that we recognize in the sharp outline here given (which includes pages 8 to 13 of the pamphlet above mentioned—translated for us by Mr. Snider) the same essential purpose that we sketched in the logical superstructure forming the conclusion to our article on the Immortality of the Soul (Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. iv. p. 109). This demonstration, in which Dr. Hoffmann follows Professor Ulrici,

unless we are utterly mistaken does not arrive at different results from those of Hegel or of his followers, and it is a profound mystery to us how Dr. Hoffmann can charge Rosenkranz with anything Pantheistic, or with expressing any doubts as to Hegel's belief in the immortality of the soul.* It

* Under the date of February 16th, 1870, Dr. Hoffmann wrote us on this subject, among other things saying the following (in Mr. F. Berg's translation):

"Rosenkranz, in his work *Hegel als der National Philosoph*, took no notice of my essay on Hegel, Rosenkranz and Baader, probably because he did not receive it in due time. His representation and critique of Baader I cannot acknowledge as sufficient, and I take the liberty to warn others against taking it as objective, correct, and proper. Rosenkranz makes Hegel assert the personality of God, and deny the individual immortality. Supposing this to be the doctrine of Hegel, it would in this respect not differ from the doctrine of Oken, certainly a very surprising result. But you certainly know how differently Hegel is interpreted and understood. There was distinguished a centre, a left, and a right wing. As representatives still living we may consider Rosenkranz, Michelet, and Erdmann. Rosenkranz says, as I before mentioned, that Hegel asserted the personality of God, and denied the individual immortality; Michelet makes Hegel deny both; Erdmann understands Hegel to assert the personality of God, and immortality. Who is right, and how is such a difference of interpretation possible?

"The persistency with which your Philosophical Journal is engaged with Hegel leads me to expect that you will some time or other enter into an inquiry and discussion about this question. You will concede that the whole future of Philosophy depends on deciding the question of the Personality of God; or rather, more definitely, whether scientifically the same can be decided or not; and if it can be decided, whether affirmation or negation is the truth. The Subject of Hegel in his Phenomenology, set up in the place of Spinoza's Substance, seems to speak for the interpretation of Rosenkranz and Erdmann. But what passages in the principal works of Hegel bear against it, I have tried to show; and Schelling in his critique of Hegel arrives at the same result.

"But if Erdmann's interpretation were, notwithstanding, correct, then Hegel would come very near Baader, and it might be understood how it was possible for Hegel to say that he thought he could agree with Baader. In all cases we should come to the conclusion that Baader ought to be studied not less extensively (thoroughly) than Hegel. The interpretation represented by Erdmann easily explains to us how Erdmann was led to introduce Baader into the history of Philosophy when no one before had done it. Deutinger's attempt in his "Principle of Philosophy" (*Princip der Philosophie*) was of no very great importance or consequence, while Erdmann's introduction of Baader into the history of Philosophy has resulted in his favor, and will produce still better results. Erdmann's attempt at a History of Modern Philosophy is, no doubt, known to you. His representation of Baader in the latter book is, in some respects, faulty; but the mistakes have disappeared in his shorter delineation in his History of Philosophy. The latter work (*Geschichte der Philosophie*) is before us in a second amended and enlarged edition, and should find a notice in your Journal. This work is full of thoughts (ideas), spirit, is impartial, and aims successfully after objectivity of representation. It deserves in a high degree your attention, and makes you acquainted with the most important philosophical literature.

seems to arise from the difficulty in mastering the modes of exposition of the Hegelians: a difficulty which forms the chief occasion of the mistakes made by Dr. Collyns Simon, the distinguished disciple of Berkeley, in his communications made to this Journal (Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. iii. p. 336 & p. 375), and in his articles in the British "Contemporary Review" (January and March, 1870). It is not the "style of expression," but the style of *exposition*, that makes the difficulty; and the Hegelian style of exposition, like that of Aristotle, is exhausting only because exhaustive: it presents the whole as a system. The Immortality of the Soul may be considered to be the subject-matter of Hegel's entire Philosophy. For he shows dialectically what is immortal, and what is not immortal, throughout the universe of mind and matter. He finds Mind eternal—not as a vague abstraction, for his caution against this is given early in the Logic (speaking of "*Etwas*" and of the "negation of negation") "not to hold fast to such generalities as Existence, Life, Thinking, &c., but to seize them in their reality as existing somewhats, living beings, &c." (cf. Werke, vol. iii. 2te Auflage, s. 114.) His whole philosophy is one continued demonstration of the concrete universality of the person against the abstract generalities of Pantheism (such, for example, as the "Humanity" of the Positivists). He would affirm with Leibnitz that only persons (Monads) exist. It were, perhaps, presumptuous in us to express ourselves so dogmatically on this point did it not seem so apparent at this distance that Hegel is known more through the traditions of his opponents than by faithful study of his own works. This it is that causes so much surprise among American thinkers when they read German reviews on the subject: Hegel in Germany is a man-of-straw which we who are confined to his original works know nothing of. It is so much easier in that country to go to the University and get Hegel from a course of lectures than to get him from those dry and prolix volumes which he left, that all this is quite natural.

Meanwhile let us join hands with Dr. Hoffmann, or any one else who defends Theism against Pantheism, and Immortality against absorption.—*EDITOR.*]

* * * * * * * But German Philosophy has already advanced so far, that with scientific certainty one may point out the principle whose completion is to be expected. To exhibit this principle and show up the necessity thereof, I have undertaken to-day, and I invite you to accompany me while I make the attempt, to lead you on to that high point from which opens before us a far-reaching prospect.

It cannot reasonably be denied, that a being *from and through itself*, i. e. an *absolute* being, must exist. If anything is, then there must also be a being from and through itself, an absolute being. Everything that is, must necessarily be either from and through itself, or by means of another. That something exists which is neither from and through itself, nor through another, is impossible. If anything has being which is not from and through itself, it must necessarily be through another. But if it is through another, then this other from which it derives its existence cannot in the end again be a being which is not through itself, but this other from which it derives its existence can only be a being through itself. Now we cannot deny that we ourselves, and the things which surround us, are. Consequently we cannot avoid the question, whether spiritual or sensuous existences, or both, exist from and through themselves, or not from and through themselves; in other words, whether they are conditioned or unconditioned existences. Human beings, or the souls of human beings, cannot be unconditioned; if so, they would have to be not only at all times, but above everything, self-sufficing, independent, and unchangeable. Neither can the things which surround us be conditioned; for they show themselves as having originated, and as in mutual dependence and changeable. But if it should be asserted that origination, dependence and changeableness concern only the phenomena of things, not their essence, and that the same be true of souls; that the multiplicity of phenomena points to a multiplicity of essences, and that corresponding to the many phenomena there must be as many unchangeable essences behind them,—then it could not be comprehended how a multiplicity of unchangeable essences could bring forth the perceptible multiplicity and variety of changeable phenomena, since owing to their rigid unchangeableness they would not be able to bring forth anything. Besides, the supposition of a multiplicity of unconditioned essences contains an insoluble contradiction. An essence from and through itself, hence unconditioned, which would have other unconditioned essences outside of and beside itself, could itself not be unconditioned. For in them a somewhat would have limits; if it were not what they were, it would inevitably be exposed to

influences from them. It would not simply determine itself from and through itself, and would therefore not be everything which it is, and what it appears to itself, viz. from and through itself. The essence which is from and through itself the unconditioned absolute essence, must also be the unlimited essence; it must also be everything unconditioned, the *whole* unconditioned without derivation of any determination of a primordial essence. There can, therefore, simply be but *one* unconditioned essence: its unity is as essential as its totality.

Hence, if there is an unconditioned essence, and that unconditioned can be but one essence, and in the one unconditioned essence must at the same time be all unconditionedness, then in this it is already involved that the one unconditioned must be an entity possessing consciousness and will. For if it were without consciousness and will, it would have its limits in that which has consciousness and will. It would be finite instead of infinite, it would be limited instead of unlimited. It could not be the conditioning, the cause of consciousness and will; it would not be unconditioned, because it would not be all unconditioned. If the unconditioned shall be the conditioning, the cause of all conditioned and originated, then it must be able to bring forth that which has capacity for consciousness and will as well as that which is without consciousness and without will. But it can bring forth that which has consciousness and will only if it itself is conscious and wills. For the cause must correspond to the effect, and what appears in the effect must be founded and included somewhere in the cause. Nothing can appear in an effect which is not established in the cause, which the cause itself does not share and possess; and this must be there valid without limitation, where the effect can be explained, not by several coöperating partial causes, but only by one single absolute cause. Hence it follows that only an entity possessing consciousness and will can be unconditioned, absolute, if it does not follow also that that which is not conscious and not willing could not be an attribute of the unconditioned. The conscious volitional entity being spirit, it follows that the Absolute in relation to the conditioned spirits is the original Spirit, and considered in and for itself, it is absolute spirit.

If the absolute is spirit, it is necessarily activity, self-activity, and pure self-activity, which creates perfectly from itself its deeds, which are thoughts, without the assistance of an Other. Absolute spirit is therefore the self-positing principle, and as such is that which is wholly without pre-supposition, is the primitive, first, which nothing can precede, but which precedes everything else in conception at least if not in time. As that which posits itself purely from and through itself, absolute spirit is everything which it is, necessarily all at once, through the one eternal and infinite act by which it produces its thoughts purely from itself. In this pure eternal and infinite act of the self-positing and self-creating of his thoughts, God actualizes only himself as absolute spirit. The being of the Absolute and its infinite determinateness [Nature] consists in the infinite totality of its thoughts distinguishing themselves in themselves, as thought by the absolute self-thinking principle. In its eternal self-position, absolute spirit distinguishes itself necessarily in itself as the self-positing, from itself as the posited. But the self-positing posits, in that which is posited, only itself. Hence it posits itself in the Posited as the self-positing. That which is posited, determined, is hence not merely determined, fixed, at rest, but likewise activity, motion. The positing principle is the Being without pre-supposition, that which is posited is the existence of the absolute; the former never becoming, never having become; the latter, the Being of the Absolute eternally become, both distinct, yet one. The transition of the Absolute from its self-positing into its being posited, from its self-determining into its self-determinateness, is hence the eternal becoming of the absolute. The absolute is thus to be grasped solely as the identity of that which eternally is and eternally becomes. Being, Becoming, Existence of the absolute, are one eternal act of the self-activity of the absolute. In this distinction in itself in which each of the distinguished elements—the absolute which is, which becomes, and which has become—is only the same absolute; it is the simple one, that which is identical with itself, that which connects together in the one act of self-distinction itself with itself. At the same time it is the Eternal and the positive Infinite. The productive acts of its self-activity as well as its immanent products,

its eternal thoughts, are necessarily ideas and the entire circuit of all possible and thinkable ideas. In the determinateness of its self-activity the absolute is necessarily objective to itself in itself, passes over immediately into opposition to itself, appears to itself in its activity as self-activity, and is reflection into itself. Therefore it distinguishes itself in itself as Essence and Phenomenon, as Ground and Consequence, as Substance and Modification. The appearance of the absolute is not appearance-for-an-Other, but *self*-appearance; Essence as ground does not exhaust itself in its consequence, but in its transition into the inexhaustible consequence remains relatively independent over against the same, and both are at the same time eternally identical and eternally distinct. In like manner substance has the same relative independence in opposition to its modifications. Substance reveals the wealth of its essence in the immeasurableness of the modifications, and the totality of modifications reflects the wealth of the substance. It is, however, still only the one self-identical absolute which as essence and appearance, as ground and consequence, as substance and modification, distinguishes itself in itself and connects itself with itself. This eternal and infinite transition from essence into appearance, from ground into consequence, from substance into modification, which is at the same time an eternal connecting of itself with itself, is the eternal life-process of the absolute, its absolute Life.

[*Remark by Dr. Hoffmann.*—“The results of the principle of the self-activity of the Absolute (as given by Ulrici) can not here be further followed out. Compare with the foregoing statements the not enough praised work of Ulrici: *Das Grundprincip der Philosophie*, ii. 297–302 ff. Also: *Gott, Natur und Mensch. System des Substantiellen Theismus*, von Dr. H. Schwartz.”]

God cannot think himself—a thinking which in one act is also a willing—without at the same time eternally distinguishing the thoughts of himself from himself. The thoughts of himself as distinguished from himself are the archetype of the world, which, as it is equally eternal with God himself, cannot be separated from his all-perfection. For it cannot be thought that God completed himself forever, and that

later, after the lapse of time, the thought of the possibility of a world to be created, and hence the archetype of the world arose within him. Rather is the original idea of the world, the creative thought and will, eternal in God, and as eternal as himself; and likewise it cannot be accepted that between the creative thought and will, and the realization of this thought and will, a space of time intervened, for it must rather be said that in God thought, will and action in their distinctness are still but one act. Likewise it cannot justly be asserted that the created world is without a beginning. For it has its beginning in the creative act, which from the standpoint of Deity, indeed, is void of time; but time and space commence only with the act of creation; hence there is no time previous to the act of creation, nor are there any epochs of time dating backwards without end. Such epochs dating backwards are only a product of the imagination of spiritual beings created in time, to which no objectivity corresponds. Time has in its beginning only a true progressive movement, and a regressive movement only in the subjective conception of the imagination of created spiritual beings.

By virtue of the infinity of his thought and knowledge, God forever sees the possibility of a world distinct from himself; by virtue of his goodness and love he wishes to realize it, and by virtue of his power he is able to create it. In his boundless infinity, he is sufficient to himself for its creation; the creation itself is no emanation, is no simple self-modification, no self-dismembering or self-dividing, but simply creative production. While the world proceeds from God, he is in nowise diminished by it; and while the world receives a different essence from God, it exists only surrounded and ruled over by the thought and will and by the power of God.

As God is the essence of all primitive forms and laws, the world can only be designed to become a total image of his divine being and life. Since God is the First, and absolute Spirit, his creative thought and will cannot satisfy itself in the production of natural beings, but he ascends in his creation to the production of spiritual beings, without himself leaving the circle of his eternity. As God brings forth spiritual beings, he necessarily brings forth free beings; beings designed to enter into a free, voluntary union with God; beings that can withdraw from, or consent to enter into, a union

with God,—but also, when they have withdrawn, they can return to Him, though not without divine preparation. The created liberty of the spiritual beings conditions the history of the world, which under God's guidance passes through the three stages, or world's epochs: (1) the state of original innocence; (2) the possible, and, as the facts in the history of the human race show, actually happening alienation from, and finally (3) the return to, God. The history of nature, connected internally with the history of spirit on account of its self-lessness [lack of subjectivity], does not pass through the same but analogous and corresponding epochs of development, and with the completion of the spiritual world enters into the completion adequate to it, as into the highest stage of spiritualization of which it is capable, without ceasing to be selfless nature. Then for the first time shall God be all in all, then shall the world be completed in God; and though God and world remain eternally distinct, still God shall dwell in the world, and the world shall have entered wholly into God.

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY.

The great political and social changes that have lately commenced in Italy, and are now in full career, are accompanied by philosophical movements of the most important kind. From the large array of evidence that goes to prove this fact, we select a few significant items mostly relating to the philosophical periodical to lay before the readers of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*.

In 1870 was established at Florence a periodical devoted to Speculative Philosophy. It appears once in two months, and its title reads: "LA FILOSOFIA DELLE SCUOLE ITALIANE; *Rivista Bimestrale contenente gli atti della Società promotrice degli studj filosofici e letterarj.* (In Firenze: coi tipi di M. Cellini e C., alla Galileiana.)"

Each number of the five that have come to hand contains, first, an account of the "Acts of the Society for the promotion of the study of Philosophy and Letters." This is followed by a number of contributions on various philosophical and literary subjects; then come critiques on new publications;